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ABSTRACT  
An academic consensus exists that the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) determines appeals against conviction in a narrow or an unduly restrictive 
manner. This consensus has developed through observation and empirical study of 
the Court over several decades. It is said in particular that the Court adopts a narrow 
approach when considering appeals which raise primarily factual issues, especially 
fresh evidence or ‘lurking doubt’ appeals. This article discusses two new empirical 
studies of the Court, one of which is a replication of Roberts’s recent study which 
featured in the Journal of Criminal Law in 2017. The empirical evidence in support of 
the allegation of a restrictive approach is explored in this article from a theoretical and 
methodological perspective. It is argued that the question of the Court’s approach is 
difficult to study empirically, and so suggestions of empirical support for a restrictive 
approach overreach the limits of the methods employed. This is not to suggest that 
the Court of Appeal does not make mistakes, nor even is it to suggest that the Court 
is not narrow or unduly restrictive. Rather, it is suggested that the empirical findings 
offered as evidence of the restrictive approach, which gives rise to the consensus 
position, is weak and should be treated with caution, especially in light of the author’s 
two new empirical studies of the Court.  
 
Introduction 
Empirical Legal Studies (ELS) is a field of legal study which aims, through systematic 
data collection and observation, to answer legal research questions.1 One area of the 
                                                          
1 See WH Van Boom, P Desmet and P Mascini, ‘Empirical Legal Research: Charting the Terrain’ in the 
same (eds), Empirical Legal Research in Action: Reflections on Methods and their Applications (Edward 
Elgar: Cheltenham, 2018) at 8. 
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England and Wales legal system which has faced some empirical scrutiny is the Court 
of Appeal (Criminal Division). Empirical studies since Knight’s in the 1970s have 
disclosed evidence of the Court having an allegedly unduly restrictive approach to 
determining appeals which raise factual issues.2 This is in contrast to appeals which 
raise largely legal or procedural irregularities; empirical studies have shown the Court 
is more likely to quash convictions due to errors of legal process than due to fresh 
evidence.3 Malleson’s research4 conducted on behalf of the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice (RCCJ),5 and Roberts’s recent study, provide apparent empirical 
evidence of the approach of the Court, and the apparent resistance of the Court to 
liberalising its approach to fresh evidence appeals.6  
 
Partly as a result of Malleson’s research, and the academic consensus7 that the Court 
appeared unduly restrictive in its approach, the RCCJ recommended what became 
the ‘unsafety test’. The Court of Appeal has operated this test since 1995, following 
the enactment of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 via an amendment to the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1968.8 The ‘unsafety test’ means the Court must quash a conviction on 
appeal if it thinks that the conviction is unsafe, and it must dismiss the appeal 
otherwise.9 There is no further definition of the meaning of an unsafe conviction given 
in the Act, and so the Court’s past jurisprudence remains relevant.10 The key pre-
amendment decisions include R v Cooper,11 which created the doctrine of ‘lurking 
doubt’, and DPP v Stafford12 where the House of Lords considered how the Court of 
Appeal should determine fresh evidence appeals. A key provision is section 23 of the 
                                                          
2 M Knight, Criminal Appeals, (Stevens and Sons: London, 1970). 
3 See K Malleson, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: Review of the Appeal Process Research 
Study No. 17 (HMSO: London, 1993). 
4 Ibid.  
5 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ) cm 2263 (HMSO: London, 1993). 
6 See most recently S Roberts, ‘Fresh Evidence and Factual Innocence in the Criminal Division of the 
Court of Appeal’ (2017) 81 J Crim L 303 (hereafter ‘Roberts’). 
7 See also for evidence of consensus, R Pattenden, English Criminal Appeals 1844 – 1994 (Clarendon: 
Oxford, 1996); R Nobles, D Schiff, Understanding Miscarriages of Justice: Law, the Media, and the 
Inevitability of Crisis (Oxford University PresS: Oxford, 2000); S Roberts, L Weathered, ‘Assisting the 
Factually Innocent: The Contradictions and Compatibility of Innocence Projects and the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission’ (2009) 1 OJLS 43. 
8 Criminal Appeal Act 1995, s 2 
9 Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (as amended) s 2.  
10 See JC Smith, ‘Legislative Comment’ (1995) Crim LR 920. 
11 (1969) 53 Cr App R 82.  
12 [1974] AC 878. 
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Criminal Appeal Act 1968, as amended, which gives the Court the power to receive 
‘fresh evidence’ if it thinks it is in the interests of justice to do so. The 1995 Act also 
created the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) which has the power to refer 
cases to the Court of Appeal for a full appeal hearing. 
  
The results of an empirical study focussing on the Court was recently published by 
Stephanie Roberts (hereafter ‘Roberts’). 13  Roberts used ‘both qualitative and 
quantitative empirical research [to] try to determine what the Court’s approach is in 
fresh evidence appeals’.14 Roberts argued that the Court does not appear to have 
adopted a more liberal approach to its powers under the ‘unsafety test’, despite the 
intention of the RCCJ when that test was recommended.15 Whilst more fresh evidence 
appeals were surmounting the hurdle of obtaining permission to appeal, evidence 
potentially of a more liberal approach, fresh evidence appeals were less likely to be 
successful in 2016 than they were in 1990.16 This is seen as a problem, as one of the 
core functions of the Court is to rectify miscarriages of justice,17 an unduly narrow 
approach may perpetuate injustice as well as correct it.18  
 
To explore the allegation of a restrictive approach in fresh evidence appeals, this 
article draws upon two new empirical studies of the Court. Firstly, a study of murder 
and rape appeals against conviction decided between 2006 and 2010 is considered. 
It is shown that for these appeals fresh evidence was the most frequently successful 
ground of appeal, giving some reason to doubt the allegation that fresh evidence 
appeals are in general rarely successful. This has some potentially troubling 
implications, as well as raising questions around sampling for empirical study of the 
Court. Secondly, Roberts’s study of fresh evidence appeals has been replicated. 
Whilst the replication study produces overall findings which are similar to Roberts’s, a 
closer analysis of the data giving rise to the findings leads to doubt about the strength 
                                                          
13 Roberts, above n 6.   
14 Ibid, at 305.  
15 Ibid, at 325. 
16 Ibid, at 320. 
17  See S Roberts, Post-Conviction Review in England and Wales: Perpetuating and Rectifying 
Miscarriages of Justice in G Lennon, C King, and C McCartney (eds) Counter Terrorism, 
Constitutionalism and Miscarriages of Justice (Hart: Oxford, 2019) at 250. 
18 Ibid, at 257 – 9.  
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of the evidence of a purported restrictive approach, and the suggestion that the Court 
is more restrictive than it was at the time of Malleson’s study. Whilst it is not necessary 
to lay claim to empirical support when evaluating the Court’s practices,19 once claims 
to empirical support are made it is necessary to adhere to certain standards if 
conclusions are to be valid.20  
 
The replication demonstrates that the question of the Court’s allegedly restrictive 
approach is inadequately specified to be susceptible to robust empirical analysis. The 
Court of Appeal has two options: to allow or to dismiss appeals. Presumably, the 
concern with an unduly restrictive approach is limited to unsuccessful appeals or 
applications. To have empirical support, it would need to be explained which 
unsuccessful appeals were considered restrictively decided and why, and which, if any, 
were not restrictively decided. Otherwise, it will appear that all unsuccessful appeals 
were considered unduly restrictive, which cannot be a realistic position to hold. The 
concern regarding the Court’s approach in fresh evidence appeals is especially 
aligned with concerns relating to the conviction of the factually innocent.21 But the 
introduction of the issue of innocence means that empirical analysis of the Court’s 
allegedly restrictive approach enters two methodological quagmires: the issue of 
determining which appellants are factually innocent, and issue of explaining the 
difference between a ‘restrictive’ decision and an appeal which was simply 
unsuccessful. Thus, Roberts’s analysis is adequate as an example of traditional 
interpretative legal research, but its conclusions are not justified empirically. This is 
not to suggest that Roberts, and others, are necessarily wrong to say the Court 
appears unduly restrictive. Rather, this article questions the methodology used to 
address the question of the Court’s approach and the strength of the purported 
evidence. This will be of broader value to anyone considering conducting ELS in the 
future. This article is primarily focussed on appeals which adduce fresh evidence. Little 
                                                          
19 See C Hoyle, M Sato, Reasons to Doubt: Wrongful Convictions and the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2019) at 14. 
20 For an in depth discussion see L Epstein, G King, ‘The Rules of Inference’ (2002) 66 U Chi L Rev 1. 
21 See H Quirk ‘Identifying Miscarriages of Justice: Why Innocence in the UK is Not the Answer’ (2007) 
70 MLR 759 for a discussion of the difficulties in considering innocence in the criminal justice process. 
See PG Cassell ‘The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful 
Conviction from False Confessions’ [1999] 22 Harvard J Law & Pub Policy 523, at 535 – 8 for a 




will be said about appeals based upon procedural irregularities, but it is important to 
note that the Court’s role is much broader than considering appellants who claim to be 
innocent or raise fresh evidence. The author considers the conviction of the innocent, 
and convictions following breaches of due process or fair trial rights to be ‘wrongful 
convictions’, and this is the term primarily used in this article.   
      
An evaluation of the Court’s allegedly restrictive approach   
The Court of Criminal Appeal (as the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) was known 
until 1966) was created by the Criminal Appeal Act 1907. Section 4 of that Act gave 
the Court broad powers to quash convictions thought unreasonable, where there was 
an error of law, or where there had been a miscarriage of justice. Despite this 
seemingly broad power, it was noted by Ross, shortly following the creation of the 
Court, that ‘cases are extremely rare in which the conviction has been quashed solely 
on the ground … [that it] was unreasonable’.22 The Court was not very busy and 
received little academic attention until the 1950s,23 when concern began to grow that 
the Court was not operating as it should.  
 
Nobles and Schiff observe the 1950s as the ‘high watermark of judicial non-receptivity’ 
in particular in relation to fresh evidence.24 Reports by the Donovan Committee,25 and 
a number of reports by the group JUSTICE, presented the Court as being restrictive 
in reopening factual issues.26 This criticism led to reformulation of the Court’s powers 
by successive Criminal Appeal Acts in the 1960s. Firstly, the Court was given the 
power to order a retrial in fresh evidence appeals.27 Secondly, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal was abolished and the Court of Appeal, which at the time heard only civil 
appeals, reconstituted into its current civil and criminal divisions.28 Thirdly, the Court’s 
                                                          
22 RE Ross, The Court of Criminal Appeal (Butterworth & Co, 1911) at 88. 
23 See Pattenden, above n 7. 
24 See Nobles and Schiff, above n 7, at 61. 
25 Donovan Committee, Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Court of Criminal Appeal 
Cmnd 2755 (HMSO: London, 1965). 
26 JUSTICE, Criminal Appeals (Stevens and Sons, 1964); JUSTICE, Miscarriages of Justice (Justice: 
London, 1989). 
27 Criminal Appeal Act 1964, s 1.  
28 Criminal Appeal Act 1966, s 1.  
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powers under section 4 of the 1907 Act were rewritten. The Court’s primary test 
became whether the conviction under review was ‘unsafe or unsatisfactory’.29  
 
It was during the operation of the ‘unsafe or unsatisfactory’ test that the ‘greatest 
disaster to have shaken British justice’30  occurred.  This crisis31  was a series of 
miscarriages of justice which had not been rectified previously by the Court of Appeal. 
It culminated in numerous quashed convictions for serious offences in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Following the quashing of the convictions of the Birmingham Six, the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ) was convened.32 This review has had 
the greatest practical impact on the Court in the medium term, owing to its 
recommendation of the ‘unsafety test’. The RCCJ included an empirical study of the 
Court of Appeal by Kate Malleson.33 She read 300 cases from 1990, and concluded 
that cases with fresh evidence were often rejected or treated with great caution by the 
Court.34 She found that the amendments to the Court’s powers in the 1960s had not 
led to a significant change in approach, which she considered to be unduly 
restrictive.35 She has also argued that the Court had a preoccupation in preserving 
finality and deference to jury verdicts, which could be best served by rarely reopening 
factual issues.36 As a result, the RCCJ called upon the Court to be readier to reverse 
jury verdicts than it had shown itself to be in the past.37 Thus, whilst the ‘unsafety test’ 
was designed to give the Court more general powers, it was done so with a proviso, 
or a hope / expectation, that it would exercise that discretion in a particular way; 
namely, in a more liberal way.  
 
Roberts has recently conducted a methodologically similar study to Malleson. Roberts 
read the first 300 cases from the year 2016, and analysed them quantitatively and 
qualitatively. She found that of the 300 cases, 42 sought to adduce fresh evidence. Of 
                                                          
29 Criminal Appeal Act 1966, s. 4. The changes were consolidated by the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 
30 Lord Devlin, ‘The Conscience of the Jury’ (1991) 107 (Jul) LQR 398. 
31 A number of books were written in reference to this period, also commonly called a ‘crisis’, see C 
Walker, K Starmer (eds) Justice in Error (Blackstone: London, 1993); M McConville, L Bridges (eds) 
Criminal Justice in Crisis (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 1994). 
32 See RCCJ, above n 5. 
33 Malleson, above n 5.  
34 Ibid, at 11. 
35 Ibid.  
36 K Malleson, ‘Appeals Against Conviction and the Principle of Finality’ (1994) 21 JL & Soc’y 151. 
37 See RCCJ, above n 5. 
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the 42 fresh evidence appeals, three were quashed.38 This seemingly low rate of 
success, 1% overall or 7% of the fresh evidence cases, when compared with 
Malleson’s higher figures from 1990, meant that ‘the chances of success remain very 
rare in fresh evidence appeals’, and in fact were significantly lower than in 1990.39 This 
led to calls for reform to the Court’s processes to seek liberalisation of its approach.40 
The use of statistics in empirical studies of the Court have furnished the allegation that 
the Court is unduly restrictive. From a methodological perspective, the use of these 
statistics is questionable. Simple statistics are far too basic to allow reliable inferences 
to be drawn. This is especially so when the complex role and normative position of the 
Court is considered.   
 
The Court’s role is to do justice to the appeals it hears, and in the criminal arena this 
is problematic because decisions as to guilt in serious crimes tried on indictment are 
first taken by a jury. The most serious error a jury can make is to convict a person who 
in fact had nothing to do with the crime, i.e. convict a ‘factually innocent’ person. That 
the Court of Appeal exists at all is due to the case of Adolf Beck, a man convicted on 
two separate occasions of two separate groups of offences in which he proved he had 
no involvement at all. 41  As Laudan discusses, the criminal trial has its own 
epistemology. 42  The criminal maxims such as the requirement of proof ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’, the choice between ‘guilty or not guilty’, and the burden of proof, 
seek to distribute errors which can arise at trial in a particular direction. Corresponding 
with the maxim that it is better to acquit a guilty person than it is to convict an innocent 
one, the structures of the criminal trial seek to make it sufficiently difficult to convict 
any defendant that the chances of convicting a factually innocent person is sufficiently 
low that it is considered safe to continue to try people. But the structures of the criminal 
                                                          
38 Roberts, above n 6, at 320. Roberts initially reported that only one conviction was quashed, as 
appeals which were ordered to be retried were not included in the calculation. It is submitted that the 
decision to omit appeal which were ordered to be retried was an erroneous decision and serves to 
artificially reduce the number of successful appeals reported. It is erroneous because in order to be 
retried, the conviction must first be quashed. The error is compounded because it is known what the 
outcome of one of the retried cases (R v Evans 2016 EWCA Crim 452) was. Evans was acquitted at 
retrial. It does not appear correct to suggest that this conviction was anything other than successful.  
39 Roberts, ibid.  
40 Ibid, at 326. 
41 See Pattenden, above n 7.  
42  See L Laudan, Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology (Cambridge 




trial does not, and does not attempt to, make it impossible to convict a factually 
innocent person. To attempt to make it impossible to convict an innocent person would 
require fundamental shifts in the structures of evidence and proof,43 such as a much 
higher standard of proof. In any event that would only be to attempt to avoid convicting 
the innocent; it could never be known whether any attempt actually succeeded or not, 
because it is rarely in truth known who is factually innocent or guilty.  
  
Whilst being required to do justice in the appeals it hears, the Court of Appeal works 
within this framework and within the system’s epistemology. It does not know for sure 
who is innocent and who is guilty, but needs to reach a decision on the safety of 
convictions. The Court cannot disregard the structures of evidence and proof and the 
logic necessary to convict. Whilst juries do not give reasons for convicting, the fact of 
conviction can allow the Court to piece together the minimum of what must have been 
accepted by the jury, if they followed their instructions.44 The fact of conviction means 
that the jury must have been sure of at least the core elements of the offence beyond 
reasonable doubt. The truth may be that the appellant is innocent, but in fresh 
evidence appeals unless an appellant is able to introduce (at least) a reasonable doubt 
there is no basis on which to quash the conviction.45 It may be thought that the Court 
ought to consider whether the jury should have convicted, not whether it could have 
convicted.46 The difficulty with this approach is that the jury did convict, and in a system 
which has the jury as the primary decision-makers the Court of Appeal cannot readily 
ignore that fact. This would be in effect a retrial by the judiciary, but the Court is not 
equipped for such a function given its limited time and resources.47     
 
It is undeniable that the judgments from the Court of Appeal frequently express the 
primacy of the jury as fact finders, and the exceptional nature of reopening factual 
issues at appeal. This can be demonstrated by the Court’s view of ‘lurking doubt’ 
                                                          
43 For arguments suggesting that the avoidance of convicting the innocent should be the primary focus, 
see M Naughton, The Innocent and the Criminal Justice System: A Sociological Analysis of 
Miscarriages of Justice (Plagrave MacMillan: Basingstoke, 2013). 
44 And assuming they were properly directed by the judge. If not this would be considered procedural 
irregularity. 
45 That is, for appellants who raise fresh evidence. Different issues arise for procedural irregularities. 
46 See Roberts, above n 6, at 326. 
47 See P Darbyshire, Sitting in Judgment: The Working Lives of Judges (Hart: Oxford, 2011) ch 14. 
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appeals. If the appellant has been unable to locate any fresh evidence, and cannot 
point to any procedural irregularity at trial, he or she can appeal on the basis of a 
‘lurking doubt’. Lord Widgery in R v Cooper developed the doctrine.48 He stated that 
the ‘unsafe or unsatisfactory’ ground under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 meant that 
if all the evidence had been before the jury, and the evidence was correctly summed 
up, the Court could still quash the conviction if they had a subjective sense of unease, 
or a ‘lurking doubt’ about the conviction. The conviction in Cooper, based on disputed 
identification evidence, was subsequently quashed. This could be considered a broad 
statement of its powers.    
 
Malleson’s study showed that despite this broad proclamation, convictions were rarely 
quashed on the basis of lurking doubt.49 The Court has in recent years retreated from 
the expansive interpretation of lurking doubt provided in Cooper. In R v Pope,50 
dismissing the appeal, the Court re-asserted that the constitutional primacy for the 
verdict rests with the jury.51 The Court said that where there is a case to answer and 
the jury has convicted, ‘it is not open to the Court to set aside the verdict on the basis 
of some collective, subjective judicial hunch that the conviction is or may be unsafe’.52 
The Court said that appeals based on ‘lurking doubt’ will be exceptional,53 and that 
reasoning was used to dismiss appeals in a number of subsequent cases.54 If following 
Pope, it becomes unclear what the judges’ role is when hearing appeals against 
conviction. If the word ‘hunch’ is replaced with ‘judgment’, that appears to be what the 
Court should be doing when it hears appeals – deciding whether the conviction is 
unsafe. What is clear is that it has been sought to close-off appeals which do not raise 
anything new; either fresh evidence or new legal argument.      
 
A further example is the unanimous Supreme Court decision in R (Nunn) v Chief 
Constable of Suffolk Police.55 The Supreme Court pointed to the different normative 
                                                          
48 R v Cooper (1969) 53 Cr App R 82. 
49 Malleson, above n 3.  
50 [2012] EWCA Crim 2241. 
51 Ibid at [14]. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid.  
54 R v Stewart [2013] EWCA Crim 1421; R v Young [2015] EWCA Crim 2305. 
55 [2014] UKSC 37; [2015] AC 225. 
10 
 
position of a defendant during a trial, and an appellant post-trial. Whilst the defendant 
is treated as innocent until being convicted, the appellant has been proved to be guilty 
to the satisfaction of the jury and this allows for inferences of the route to verdict to be 
drawn.56 The Court said there is a ‘powerful public interest in the finality of proceedings’ 
and in not reopening proceedings without good reason.57 Clearly, there is a logic and 
a truth to this. A more nuanced argument is to acknowledge that the appeal process 
in particular involves a balance between the interests of prisoners and appellants, 
victims, and the public at large.58  
 
In seeking to explore the question of the Court’s approach empirically, Roberts, and 
by extension Malleson before her, sought to make descriptive inferences regarding 
the Court’s performance and approach.59 That is, using facts which can be observed 
– information from judgments – to explore something which is normative or cannot be 
directly observed – whether the Court is unduly restrictive.60 If it is said that there is 
empirical support for a particular claim, it is implied that qualitative or quantitative data 
has been collected in some systematic way. 61  If seeking to determine through 
empirical study whether the Court decides appeals in an unduly restrictive manner, it 
would need to be explained what would be seen in the data if that was the case – the 
‘observable implications’.62 This is how the ‘normative’ becomes ‘concrete’ and so can 
be observed in a dataset.63 In particular, it would need to be explained what the 
difference is between an unsuccessful appeal and an appeal determined in a 
restrictive manner. Since presumably some unsuccessful appeals are not considered 
restrictive, there must be a difference.   
 
It is difficult to know what is meant by an unduly restrictive approach, in such a way 
that it can be recorded empirically. To say that a decision is unduly restrictive, which 
appears to mean little more than the decision is disagreeable or could have been 
                                                          
56 Ibid, at [32]. 
57 Ibid.  
58 C McCartney, ‘Case Comment’ (2015) 19(2) E & P 120, at 126 
59 See L Epstein, and G King, ‘The Rules of Inference’ (2002) 66 U Chi L Rev 1, at 29 – 31. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See Van Boom, Desmet and Mascin, above n 1, at 8-9. 
62 Epstein and King, above n 59, at 29-30. 
63 Ibid, at 34.  
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decided differently, is inherently subjective. In the absence of a clear explanation of 
the meaning of an unduly restrictive approach, it can mean that the observer simply 
disagrees with the outcome of certain appeals. The primary evidence offered for the 
contention that the Court is restrictive is that there is a low overall success rate. This 
entails the assumption that at least some unsuccessful appeals were in fact dismissed 
due to a restrictive approach and that this can be demonstrated empirically. This will 
be very difficult to prove in an empirical way. Without knowing what the right answer 
to the appeal was, it cannot be known whether the Court was right or wrong, restrictive 
or justified, in dismissing an appeal. Roberts acknowledges that at least one 
unsuccessful appeal in her study was, in her view, understandably dismissed by the 
Court.64 With this concession, the claim that the low success rate found is evidence of 
a restrictive approach is undermined, because at least one of the unsuccessful 
appeals was not restrictively decided. This raises the question of how many other 
unsuccessful appeals were at least arguably not determined in a restrictive way. More 
importantly, it raises the question of what, if unsuccessful appeals are not necessarily 
restrictive, is meant by the word restrictive.  
 
Fresh Evidence in the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
The Court of Appeal has the power to receive fresh evidence by section 23 of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (as amended by the 1995 Act). Section 23(1) states that the 
Court can receive fresh evidence if they think it is ‘necessary or expedient in the 
interests of justice’ to do so. In deciding whether it is in the interests of justice to receive 
any evidence, the Court must have regard to the following four factors in section 23(2):  
 
(a)whether the evidence appears to the Court to be capable of belief; 
(b)whether it appears to the Court that the evidence may afford any ground for 
allowing the appeal; 
(c)whether the evidence would have been admissible in the proceedings from which 
the appeal lies on an issue which is the subject of the appeal; and 
                                                          
64 Roberts, above n 6, at 324. 
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(d)whether there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce the evidence in 
those proceedings 
 
The Court of Appeal has frequently stated that the interest of justice test is the 
overriding test for the admission of fresh evidence. In R v Erskine; R v Williams65 the 
Court made it plain that its focus is upon the ‘interests of justice’ test, and the four 
factors are neither exhaustive nor conclusive. 66  This has been repeated in later 
cases.67  
 
In relation to factor (d), this is the factor which is said to cause appellants the most 
difficulty in fresh evidence appeals.68 If the evidence was available at trial, and the 
appellant cannot provide a reasonable explanation for failing to adduce it, the evidence 
is not fresh and so the Court will usually decline to admit it under section 23. If the 
appellant can provide a reasonable explanation then the test is passed. As is made 
clear in Erskine, the appellant will need to provide good reasons for not adducing 
evidence at trial.69 However, even if the appellant cannot provide good reasons or if 
the evidence is not fresh, but the evidence would make the conviction unsafe, the 
Court will always admit it.70  
 
Roberts considered whether the four factors are too easily used in order to decline to 
admit fresh evidence.71 She found that they were and ‘it would seem that the judiciary 
are applying s 23(1) restrictively by imposing the conditions in s 23(2) on s 23(1)’.72 In 
particular, she found that ‘the most common reason for rejecting the fresh evidence 
under section 23 was because the evidence was available at trial and there was no 
reasonable explanation as to why it was not used’.73     
                                                          
65 [2009] EWCA Crim 1425. 
66 Ibid, at [39]. 
67 See R v Grant-Murray [2017] EWCA Crim 1228; R v Rogers [2016] EWCA Crim 801; R v Bakir [2014] 
EWCA Crim 2420.  
68 Roberts, above n 6, at 323. 
69 Erskine, above, n 65, at [39]. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Roberts, above n 6, at 321. 
72 Ibid, at 324. 
73 Ibid, at 321. 
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Roberts cited five cases, Calvert, Pratt, Osmani, Day, and Reid, from her sample 
which were rejected because the Court said there was no reasonable explanation for 
not calling the evidence at trial. 74  This is taken to be evidence of a restrictive 
application of its powers. An inspection of these cases reveals, however, that factor 
(d) was not the only reason for declining to admit the evidence in these cases. In R v 
Calvert75 the Court rejected new analysis of CCTV evidence, but this was because the 
issue had already been aired extensively at trial. The ‘fresh’ evidence ‘would not in 
any event have afforded any ground for allowing the appeal’.76 In R v Pratt77 the 
evidence of a new expert was rejected in part because the evidence could have been 
adduced at trial, but also because, in the Court’s view, ‘even if such evidence had 
been admitted at trial, the outcome in this case would have been the same’.78     
 
In R v Osmani,79 after confirming that the ‘bedrock’ of a fresh evidence appeal is the 
interests of justice test,80 rejected the fresh evidence in part because trial tactics meant 
that the evidence was not strictly fresh, but also because ‘there can be little faith in the 
reliability of anything that [M] said in the course of this conversation’ which formed the 
fresh evidence. 81  In Day, 82  a number of pieces of fresh evidence were rejected 
because of factor (d), but also because the fresh evidence was inadmissible, or did 
‘not assist on the question of allowing the appeal’.83 In Reid84 the Court said there was 
no reasonable explanation for failing to call the new witnesses, but also, ‘in any event, 
we do not see how this evidence would have made a difference’.85 It is possible that 
the Court was acting in a deliberately ‘restrictive’ manner by declining to admit the 
fresh evidence in these cases. An alternative, and preferred, explanation is that after 
considering the evidence properly against the facts of the case, the new evidence 
would not have made the conviction unsafe. If the Court is sure that the evidence 
                                                          
74 Ibid, see note 131 therein. 
75 [2016] EWCA Crim 890. 
76 Ibid, at [41]. 
77 [2016] EWCA Crim 1304 
78 Ibid, at [23]. 
79 [2016] EWCA Crim 26. 
80 Ibid, at [37]. 
81 Ibid, at [52]. 
82 [2016] EWCA Crim 645. 
83 Ibid, at [24]. 
84 [2016] EWCA Crim 341. 
85 Ibid, at [17].  
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would make no difference, in effect this is the statutory test under section 23(2)(b) then 
it will be highly unlikely that the Court will find it in the interests of justice to admit the 
evidence. To suggest otherwise is to maintain that the Court should receive evidence 
which it – and it is the Court, for better or for worse, which has been tasked with making 
the decision – does not think would make the conviction unsafe. 
 
An alternative source of the potentially restrictive approach relates how it decides 
whether the fresh evidence makes the conviction unsafe once they have admitted it. 
Roberts argues that there are arguably two ‘approaches’ the Court can take to 
determining fresh evidence appeals.86 These are the supposedly more liberal ‘jury 
impact’ test and a supposedly more restrictive ‘Stafford’ approach.87 In the jury impact 
test the judges are to consider what impact the fresh evidence might have had on the 
jury. This may be more liberal because it might be thought that if the evidence had not 
been before the jury, it is at least possible it could impact the decision to convict and 
so the conviction should be unsafe. The Stafford approach asks the judges to weigh 
up all the evidence, including any not before the jury, and ask whether the conviction 
remains safe. Roberts suggests that the Stafford approach is restrictive because it 
allows the Court of Appeal to dismiss appeals if it is sure that the appellant is guilty, 
despite a jury having never tested the new evidence.88 The case of R v Pendleton89 
was supposed to bring clarity to how the Court determines fresh evidence appeals. 
The House of Lords in this case held that Stafford was the correct approach, but ‘in 
any case of difficulty’ the Court should test its provisional view by asking whether the 
evidence might reasonably have affected the decision of the jury to convict.90 This is 
seen as reintroducing the apparently more liberal jury-impact test.   
 
It is difficult to see that there is any great substantive difference between the Stafford 
approach and the jury-impact approach. They are both part of the question of whether 
the conviction is unsafe. Roberts notes that the supposedly more restrictive Stafford 
approach is used to both allow and dismiss appeals, and the supposedly liberal jury-
                                                          
86 Roberts, above n 6, at 313 – 8. 
87 See Stafford v DPP [1974] AC 878. 
88 Roberts, above n 6, at 314. 
89 [2001] UKHL 66. 
90 Ibid, at [19]. 
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impact approach is used to both dismiss and allow appeals.91 When Lord Bingham in 
Pendleton left open the jury impact test it could be seen as failing to bring some clarity 
to the issue.92 The difficulty is that the House of Lords could not stipulate specific rules, 
because each case is fact-specific; the outcomes of appeals depend upon the opinions 
of the judges as to the overall strength of the case.93 If the Court is sure of the safety 
or unsafety of the conviction, it will not need to apply or state the ‘jury impact’ test.94 It 
would clearly be possible for the Court of Appeal to decide to be more open in 
quashing convictions on the basis of fresh evidence. There is no right answer to 
whether this would be the right approach, it would again need to balance the interests 
of appellants and the interests of victims and the public interest in finality. Whether the 
Court currently has that balance correct is questionable.95     
  
In Roberts’s sample of 300 cases, 42 cases (14%) raised fresh evidence. Three 
convictions were quashed on the basis of fresh evidence, giving a success rate of 7% 
of the 42, or 1% of the 300 cases. This led Roberts to conclude that the chances of 
success are low in fresh evidence cases due to a restrictive approach. The Court 
cannot readily be criticised for not quashing convictions on the basis of fresh evidence 
in cases where there was no fresh evidence raised. If 300 is used as the denominator, 
and the number of successful appeals on the basis of fresh evidence (three)96 is the 
numerator, then a low (1%) success rate will follow. But the large majority of the 300 
cases did not attempt to raise any fresh evidence, so 300 is not the correct 
denominator and it is liable to mislead. A denominator of 42 is more suitable if trying 
to calculate a success rate for appeals which raised fresh evidence. The 1% success 
rate provided by Roberts should not readily be used as an indicator of the likelihood 
of success in fresh evidence cases.      
 
                                                          
91 Roberts, above n 6, at 317 – 8 
92 Ibid, 314. 
93 See A Ashworth, M Redmayne, The Criminal Process (4th ed, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
2010) at 383. 
94 Ibid.  
95 See for example D Hamer, ‘Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the Finality Principle: The Need for 
a Criminal Cases Review Commission’ (2014) (37)(1) UNSW Law Journal 270. 
96 See n 38 above, for an explanation of why three is used as the numerator in this paper. 
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As stated above, the ‘observable implications’ of a restrictive approach have not been 
specified clearly. It is only by explaining how data relating to the restrictive approach 
has been collected in a systematic way that it is possible to lay claim to empirical 
support for the allegation, rather than appearing to rely on subjective opinion.97 There 
are some suggestions, such as the success rate, or fresh evidence being rejected 
under section 23(2)(d),98 but it needed to be explained more clearly how Roberts 
decided which outcomes were ‘restrictive’ and which were not, or which she simply 
disagreed with. By using the low overall success rate as an indicator of an approach, 
there was little consideration of whether the label ‘restrictive’ was always justified. This 
is quite simplistic and not a systematic empirical method. Roberts accepts that not all 
the appellants relying on fresh evidence will be innocent, and the Court does need to 
decide which appeals should be allowed and which dismissed.99 However, the lack of 
explanation as to what does constitute an unduly restrictive decision means it is not 
possible to know how decisions were reached by her as to whether an appeal was 
determined restrictively. As Roberts acknowledges, it is difficult to envisage how the 
concept of an appeal being determined restrictively could be made more concrete for 
empirical analysis.100 Nevertheless, the methods employed by Roberts do not appear 
sufficient to evidence the Court’s allegedly restrictive approach in an empirical sense.       
 
In order to evaluate claims regarding the Court’s approach further, the results of two 
new studies of the Court are discussed. In so doing, further weaknesses in the 
evidence for a restrictive approach will be exposed.  
        
Study One: Murder and Rape Appeals 2006 – 2010 
In this study, all murder and rape full appeals (not applications for permission) against 
conviction decided between January 2006 and December 2010 were analysed. There 
were a total of 472 appeals in this sample. 135 of the appeals were successful, giving 
a success rate of 28%. 55 murder appeals were successful, and 80 rape appeals were 
                                                          
97 See L Epstein, G King, n 59, at 29 – 34. 
98 Roberts, above n 6 at 313. 
99 Roberts, above n 6, at 326. 
100 Ibid, 318. 
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successful. Clearly, this success rate is significantly higher than in Roberts’s study; 
the reasons for this are discussed further below.  
   
All the grounds of appeal raised in the appeals were collected. This replicates previous 
work by Malleson for the RCCJ,101 and Roberts.102 The following table shows the top 
five grounds of appeal raised in the 472 appeals, and the frequency in which each 
ground was a successful ground of appeal.  
 
Table 1: Five Most Common Grounds of Appeal Raised in Murder and Rape 
Appeals 2006-2010  
Issue Raised Number of Cases 
Raised (% of cases 




Summing Up 216 (45%) 38 
Misuse of Evidential Discretion 166 (35%) 24 
Fresh Evidence 130 (27%) 59 
Refused No Case To Answer 51 (10%) 2  






                                                          
101 Malleson, above n 3.  
102 S Roberts, ‘The Decision Making Process of Appeals Against Conviction in the England and Wales 





The following two tables show the top five grounds of appeal and frequency of success 
in murder and rape appeals respectively.  
 
Table 2: Five Most Common Grounds of appeal raised in sampled appeals: 
Murder 
Issue Raised Number of Cases 
Raised (% of cases 




Summing Up 110 (45%)  15 
Misuse of Evidential Discretion 87 (36%)  8 
Fresh Evidence 76 (31%)  31 
Refused No Case To Answer 34 (14%)  2 
Unfair Trial Specifically 27 (11%)  2 
 
 
Table 3: Five Most Common Grounds of appeal raised in sampled appeals: Rape. 
Issue Raised Number of Cases 
Raised (% of cases 




Summing Up 106 (45%) 23 
Misuse of Evidential Discretion 79 (34%)  16 
Fresh Evidence 54 (23%) 28 
Refused No Case To Answer 17 (7%)  0 
Unfair Trial Specifically 23 (10%) 6 
 
In table 1, it can be seen that the three most commonly argued grounds of appeal 
overall were allegations of errors in the trial judge’s summing up; claims that the judge 
in some way misused their direction to include or exclude evidence; and fresh 
evidence. Note that the ‘lurking doubt’ ground does not appear in the tables: it was 
raised 30 times overall and was successful on three occasions (twice in murder, once 
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in rape).   Overall, appellants in murder appeals raised broadly the same grounds as 
those in rape appeals. Fresh evidence stands out as the individual ground which was 
most frequently a successful ground of appeal (successful on 59 occasions, 45% of 
the times it was raised). This is significantly higher than the fresh evidence success 
rate found in Roberts’s study (7%).   
 
Fresh evidence was raised in 76 murder appeals and 54 rape appeals. Whilst fresh 
evidence was raised more frequently in murder appeals, it was marginally more 
frequently successful in rape appeals.  There were 28 convictions for rape quashed 
on the basis of fresh evidence: 51% of the times it was raised.  There were 31 murder 
convictions quashed on basis of fresh evidence, which is 40% of the times it was raised.  
This suggests that while fresh evidence is less forthcoming in rape appeals it is more 
likely to be considered persuasive than in murder appeals. 
 
Of the 130 fresh evidence appeals, 33 (25%) were CCRC referrals. Twenty of the 
CCRC’s fresh evidence referrals were successful (60% of CCRC fresh evidence 
referrals). Therefore, 33% of the successful fresh evidence appeals were CCRC 
references. The CCRC clearly had an impact in increasing the number of fresh 
evidence appeals reaching Court, and in increasing the number of successful fresh 
evidence appeals. The rate of CCRC referrals might go some way towards explaining 
why there is a higher success rate for fresh evidence appeals in this sample of murder 
and rape appeals than was seen in previous studies. Without the CCRC referrals there 
were 97 appeals raising fresh evidence (20% of all cases) of which 39 were successful; 
a 40% success rate. This remains significantly higher than Malleson’s / Roberts’s 
success rate.        
 
As can be seen from the above, in this study, fresh evidence was the ground of appeal 
which was most frequently successful. In murder and rape appeals, at least, it cannot 
be said that the Court of Appeal treats fresh evidence with particular caution or that 
they are particularly rare. As this sample included only rape and murder appeals, it 
cannot be said that this is any evidence against the Court’s allegedly restrictive 
20 
 
approach at fresh evidence appeals in general. However, one conclusion which can 
be drawn from this is that the incidence of fresh evidence appears related to the 
offence which is being appealed, and that murder and rape are more susceptible to 
raising fresh evidence than other offences. There are several potential reasons for 
murder and rape being more susceptible to success, such as appellants serving longer 
in prison giving them more time and determination to uncover fresh evidence which 
undermines their convictions. Lawyers may be more prepared to act (especially pro 
bono) in more serious offences, and it may be easier to gain public support for 
suspected / potential miscarriages of justice in more serious offences. 
 
A potentially disturbing implication of this finding is that fairly high numbers of murder 
and rape convictions in the period 2006 – 2010 were overturned by fresh evidence. 
This means that those appellants were in some way wrongfully convicted, and all will 
have served prison sentences. There has not yet been sufficient research to determine 
at what rate convictions for other offences are overturned. Given that it might be 
assumed that murder and rape investigations are the most careful and the most 
thorough, it is troubling to find that a high proportion are later shown to be wrongful 
convictions. It raises the question of whether, if other offences were given closer 
scrutiny either by the Court or the CCRC, more wrongful convictions would be 
uncovered.   
 
When only full appeals against conviction for the most serious offences are considered, 
it is shown that fresh evidence has a good chance of being successful. This is partly 
explained by the fact that the CCRC conducts more investigations into serious 
offences, and so are more likely to refer convictions for serious offences. A further 
reason for the higher success rate seen here is that all these cases have passed the 
leave filter, and so clearly more likely to be successful. This point is returned to in the 
next section. What is clear is that for the offences of murder and rape the chance of 
success on the basis of fresh evidence is not low, at least once permission to appeal 
has been granted.  
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Study Two: Fresh Evidence Appeals Decided January – July 2016 
Roberts’s study of fresh evidence appeals from 2016 has been replicated. In 
replicating Roberts’s study, it has not been sought to disprove empirically the 
allegation that overall the Court has a restrictive approach to factual issue appeals. As 
discussed above, the reason for this is that the meaning of a restrictive approach has 
not been sufficiently specified by Roberts, meaning a replication of that question is 
impossible. Rather, adopting a more traditional interpretative approach in places, it is 
suggested through the replication exercise that based upon the information provided 
in judgments, some unsuccessful appeals do not appear to be restrictively decided. 
There is no claim to empirical evidence against the restrictive approach offered here. 
It is always possible to point to reasons as to why an appeal was arguable, and that 
by dismissing it the Court might have been restrictive.103 The aim of this replication is 
to highlight some of the cases which on balance in the author’s view did not appear 
restrictive. If the view that these appeals did not appear restrictive is preferred, then 
the headline low success rate is not evidence of being restrictive, but only evidence 
that relatively few appeals are successful. Whilst that is useful to know, that statistic 
does not support the assertion of an unduly restrictive approach. This section also 
highlights some flaws in the analysis of data in Roberts’s study, many of which will 
also apply to Malleson’s 1990 study.    
 
Roberts states that she read the first 300 available appeals from 2016 on CaseTrack, 
finding 42 fresh evidence appeals between January and July. For the purposes of this 
replication, only fresh evidence appeals were considered. The Westlaw UK and 
LexisLibrary databases were searched to attempt to locate all the fresh evidence 
appeals decided between January and July 2016. 104  48 cases were located, 
concerning 56 individual appellants / applicants. In contrast to the sample of murder 
and rape appeals, this sample, like Roberts’s, contains both full appeals and renewed 
applications. This is a crucial point, returned to below, in understanding the cases 
which were contained in Roberts’s 1% success rate. It is reasonable to assume that 
the additional cases located in the replication occurred after the 300 appeals in 
                                                          
103 One argument being that, for those who were represented, there were lawyers prepared to make 
the case for them in Court. 
104 The CaseTrack service was discontinued in February 2017 before this replication commenced. 
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Roberts’s overall sample. The following table shows the neutral citation numbers for 
all the cases in this replication sample.   
 
Table 4: List of cases in sample (neutral citation case number) 
14 26 52 117 194 266 
278 308 316 341 350 361 
380 440 452 453 456 464 
473 474 499 504 571 590 
645 677 890 921 945 1030 
1066 1114 1131 1192 1245 1255 
1264 1299 1304 1305 1374 1565 
1597 1607 1683 1798 1818 1842 
 
Based upon the information provided in Roberts’s article, the two samples can be 
compared. Both samples had three successful appeals; an overall success rate of 6% 
in the replication sample, compared with 7% in Roberts’s sample. There were four 
cases which Roberts cited in her article which could not be located for this 
replication.105 One of the cases which Roberts cited which could not be located was R 
v IB,106 which was one of the three successful appeals in her sample.107 There were, 
however, still three successful appeals in the replication sample, two108  of which 
Roberts referred to in her article, and one (R v Bryant) which she did not.109 Bryant 
occurred in late July so may have occurred after Roberts’s sample of 300 cases.110 Of 
the 48 individual cases in the replication sample, Roberts cited 36 (75%) of them. The 
samples are not exact but it is clear that many of the same cases have been located. 
 
Turning to the replication sample, 41 cases (85%) were renewed applications, not full 
appeals, none of which were granted permission. Seven cases were full appeals, three 
of which were successful, a success rate of 42%. It appears that there were six full 
                                                          
105 These were R v Otti [2016] EWCA Crim 865; R v IB [2016] EWCA Crim 1758; R v Bish [2016] 
EWCA Crim 699; R v Robinson [2016] EWCA Crim 762. 
106 Ibid.  
107 It is possible that this case was only available on CaseTrack. 
108 She referred to R v Evans [2016] EWCA Crim 452, and R v Chitolie [2016] EWCA Crim 14. 
109 [2016] EWCA Crim 1245. 
110 It is possible that R v IB and R v Bryant are the same case, but they do not appear to be. The IB 
case did not appear in the search for cases. 
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fresh evidence appeals, with three of them successful, in Roberts’s sample, a success 
rate of 50%.111 The rest being renewed applications, none of which were granted 
permission.112  
 
It can be seen that a high number of renewed applications produces samples which 
are biased towards unsuccessful outcomes and low success rates. When so many 
cases are renewed applications for permission it should not be surprising that the 
overall success rate is low. The reason for this bias is that applications are decided 
differently from appeals. The test in applications is whether the grounds are 
‘reasonably arguable’. If a renewed application is successful, the conviction is not 
usually quashed, there will need to be another hearing at a later date. This signifies 
the fundamentally different character of appeals and applications. The test for being 
granted permission to appeal would appear to be lower than needing to demonstrate 
that the conviction is unsafe. It follows that where an application for permission is 
rejected, the Court does not think that it is even reasonably arguable that the grounds, 
or in this sample the fresh evidence, would make the conviction unsafe. To the extent 
that it might be assumed that at least a proportion of the applications are genuinely 
hopeless, it is questionable why the label ‘restrictive’ should always be attached to a 
decision to decline permission.  
 
It may be argued that the sample of full murder and rape appeals discussed above is 
also biased, but in favour of successful appeals. Full appeals are significantly more 
likely to be successful in any sample of cases because they have already been through 
the application process (or, for CCRC references, a thorough review) and judges / the 
CCRC have already decided that the grounds are reasonably arguable or that there is 
a realistic possibility that the conviction will be quashed. Whilst both samples are 
biased, it is argued that the sample of full appeals presents a more accurate picture of 
the Court’s decision-making. Furthermore, because the test operated in renewed 
applications is fundamentally different from that operated in appeals against conviction 
                                                          
111 Roberts, above n 6, at 325. Roberts’s article would have benefitted from being clearer on this 
issue. 
112 Ibid, at 319, and table 2 at 318. 
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there are in effect two different questions being answered by the Court. By including 
both appeals and applications in the sample, and not offering any discussion of the 
differences between these kinds of cases, important alternative explanations for the 
low success rate in appeals is not considered. A key alternative explanation for the 
finding that there was a low success rate in the Court of Appeal in Roberts’s sample 
is that most of her cases were renewed applications which, for a variety of reasons, 
are not the strongest cases. 
 
One of Roberts’s key arguments is that the adoption of the unsafety test has not 
altered the Court’s approach. She reached this conclusion by comparing her results 
with Malleson’s for the RCCJ. In Malleson’s study of 300 appeals from 1990, there 
were 23 fresh evidence appeals, and six were successful,113 compared with Roberts 
who found 42 fresh evidence appeals only three of which were successful. This led 
Roberts to reach the conclusion that the chances of success were significantly lower 
in 2016 than they were in 1990 – which, if true, may be indicative of the failure of the 
unsafety test to alter the Court’s approach. In Hoyle and Sato’s recent wide-ranging 
analysis of the CCRC, they noted that the conclusions drawn in Roberts’s article 
correlates with the general feeling within the CCRC that the Court is slower to accept 
fresh evidence than it might have been in the past.114  
 
There are some reasons to be sceptical of Robert’s analysis. It is suspected that 
Roberts read more renewed applications for permission than Malleson did. As 
explained above, an abundance of renewed applications leads to a lower overall 
success rate. Roberts notes the apparent increase in renewed applications in her 2016 
study compared to Malleson’s in 1990,115 but does not appear to appreciate the impact 
this will have on her analysis. If Roberts read more renewed applications than 
Malleson did, for the reasons explained above, it would be likely that the success rate 
would be lower. Further, while Roberts explains the apparent difference in success 
rate as being caused by a continued restrictive approach, it may be the case that more 
                                                          
113 Ibid, at 320. 
114 See Hoyle and Sato, above n 19, at 331 – 2. 
115 See Roberts, above n 6, at footnote 117. 
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of the appeals were simply hopeless in 2016 than in 1990. It is submitted that the 
primary reason Roberts has a low success rate in her sample has nothing to do with 
the alleged ‘approach’ of the Court, and everything to do with the fact that renewed 
applications are less likely to be successful than full appeals.  
 
In the replication sample, the Court would frequently describe the renewed 
applications as being hopeless. For instance, in R v Dillon116 the application was 
described as being an ‘expensive waste of time.’117 The fresh evidence in R v Martin118 
was considered ‘not credible on its face’.119 R v AXN120 was described as having no 
merit. In R v S,121 in which a series of text messages and photographs were submitted 
as fresh evidence, the Court could not understand what was supposed to be 
demonstrated by the evidence or its relevance to the conviction.122 In R v Angel123 the 
fresh evidence application was considered hopeless because the evidence was not 
fresh. A number of these cases are cited in Roberts’s article as possible evidence of 
restrictive applications of the Court’s powers. It is not clear upon what basis they were 
restrictive, other than the fact they were unsuccessful.      
 
As has been discussed, it is too simplistic to use unsuccessful appeals as an indicator 
of the Court’s approach. If an appeal is dismissed it does not necessarily mean that 
the Court was restrictive. Roberts accepts that the Court’s decision in R v Aboulkadir124 
could be considered an understandable decision because the DNA evidence raised at 
appeal demonstrated that the appellant was lying at trial.125 This undermines Roberts’s 
argument that a low success rate evidences a restrictive approach, because she 
accepts that some of the unsuccessful appeals did not appear to be decided 
restrictively. Although only an incomplete picture of the appeal can be gained from 
                                                          
116 [2016] EWCA Crim 316. 
117 Ibid at [15] – [16]. 
118 [2016] EWCA Crim 474. 
119 Ibid, at [10]. 
120 [2016] EWCA Crim 590. 
121 [2016] EWCA Crim 1607. 
122 Ibid, at [28]. 
123 [2016] EWCA Crim 945. 
124 [2016] EWCA Crim 456. 
125 Roberts, above n 6, at 324. 
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reading Court transcripts, this is the same information that Roberts had, and it is 
possible to argue that there are other unsuccessful appeals which were at least 
understandable.  
  
In this way, it is hard to argue against the Court’s findings in cases such as R v Quye,126 
R v Shaikh127  or R v JM128 that the fresh evidence adduced lacked any credibility. For 
the case of Shaikh, Roberts does not say whether she considered this appeal to be 
restrictively decided or not, but it forms part of the low success rate and so by 
implication must be included within the class of restrictive appeals. As the applicant 
was unrepresented, she suggests that the appellant could have done better with legal 
representation, and implies that the Court dealt with this case (and others) in a 
somewhat perfunctory manner. 129  However, it is understandable why the Court 
rejected the application. The applicant was convicted of offering to engage in regulated 
activity (in this case, a cardiac physiologist) from which he was barred. He had 
attempted to apply for employment as a cardiologist, despite being barred from 
working with vulnerable adults. His defence was that he did not apply for the positions 
but it was either a computer error or a forgery.130 The Court noted that these are highly 
unlikely events.131 His fresh evidence was a number of documents on a USB stick. 
The application was refused because the ‘evidence was clearly not capable of belief 
and is inconsistent with the defence advanced at trial. There is no proof that the 
document is genuine, or that it was stored on the USB stick. The applicant has been 
found on a number of occasions in the course of these various proceedings to have 
forged false documents’.132 Whilst it is pertinent to note that the judgment from the 
Court is clearly used to justify the decision to dismiss the appeal, it is difficult to argue 
against the account given by the Court for rejecting the application.   
 
                                                          
126 [2016] EWCA Crim 1815. 
127 [2016] EWCA Crim 504. 
128 [2016] EWCA Crim 1264. 
129 Roberts, above n 6, at 324. 
130 R v Shaikh, above n 127, at [9]. 
131 Ibid at [10]. 
132 Ibid, at [18].  
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There are other unsuccessful cases in the sample where the decision to dismiss the 
appeal appears at least understandable. For example, in R v Oldfield,133 the applicant 
was convicted of causing danger by interfering with a vehicle without reasonable 
cause – he had pulled the handbrake of his wife’s car while she was driving. He 
admitted having done so, but said he had reasonable cause. The question for the jury 
was whether he had reasonable cause, and they convicted him. He sought to adduce 
further evidence from two witnesses who had testified at trial. The Court rejected the 
application because the first statement did not add to what the witness said at trial, 
and the second statement appeared to be exactly the same as the one read out at 
trial.134 On one view this decision could be considered restrictive, because the Court 
could have allowed the appeal even if the differences between the new statements 
was only minor to those given at trial. However, at the very least it is arguable that this 
decision was understandable in that nothing new appeared to be raised at the appeal.  
 
A further case is R v Dillon,135 the applicant was convicted of dangerous driving. A car 
was driven erratically and then crashed. The applicant was later found on foot with the 
keys to the crashed car in his pocket, and he was the registered keeper. The applicant, 
who had many convictions for driving offences, denied he was the driver at the time. 
His fresh evidence application appears to have been to call the then Chief Constable, 
the Director of Public Prosecutions and another unnamed member of the prison 
service.136 Roberts cites this case alongside Shaikh, in suggesting that the applicant’s 
lack of legal representation might have hindered his chances of success. However, 
although the Court did not provide details as to the content of the fresh evidence, on 
any view it is appears unlikely that the Chief Constable would be able to provide 
evidence in a case of this nature. As this appeal was unsuccessful, it would always 
have been open to the Court to be liberal and at least grant permission to appeal. But 
on the basis of what the Court said, there is nothing to think that the decision to refuse 
was unreasonable.      
    
                                                          
133 [2016] EWCA Crim 194 
134 Ibid, at [13]. 
135 [2016] EWCA Crim 316. 
136 Ibid, at [15].  
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Conclusion   
This article has explored the evidence that the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) has 
allegedly adopted a restrictive approach to its powers. There has been an apparent 
academic consensus amongst those interested, since at least the 1970s, that the 
Court has indeed had a restrictive approach to its powers. It has been sought to 
challenge the strength of the evidence of this approach. Roberts’s recent study of the 
Court produced a number of headline statistics about the Court. She found that only a 
small number of appeals in her sample of 300 appeals were successful on the basis 
of fresh evidence. In this article, a number of substantial flaws have been highlighted 
with this statistic. Firstly, since only a small number of appellants raise fresh evidence, 
it follows that only a small number of convictions will be quashed on the basis of fresh 
evidence. Secondly, most of the appeals making up her sample were not appeals at 
all, but applications for permission. When these are rejected, it means that the Court 
felt the appeal was not even reasonably arguable. It is suggested this gives an insight 
into the kind of fresh evidence raised in many applications. It has been shown that it 
is unclear what is meant by the Court having adopted an unduly restrictive approach, 
or what it means for a case to be restrictively decided. It is suggested that the low 
likelihood of success seen in Roberts’s study has more to do with the sample of 
appeals than being evidence of an approach.  
  
Through two studies of the Court, one of which was a replication of Roberts’s study, it 
has been suggested that there are other ways of looking at statistics from the Court. 
When only full appeals raising fresh evidence are considered, fresh evidence has a 
good chance of being successful. This does not support the view that the Court is 
particularly slow to quash convictions on the basis of fresh evidence, at least for 
murder or rape. Further, it has been suggested that some appeals or applications were 
not strong candidates to be quashed by fresh evidence. In summary, it is difficult to 
judge whether the Court has a restrictive approach, and it is very difficult to test this in 
an empirical sense. Roberts’s previous study is insufficiently robust to give support to 
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